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Transnational householdsAlthough most theoretical models of household decision making assume perfect information, empirical
studies suggest that information asymmetries can have large impacts on resource allocation. I demonstrate
the importance of these asymmetries in transnational households, where physical distance between family
members can make information barriers especially acute. I implement an experiment among migrants in
Washington, DC, and their families in El Salvador that examines how information asymmetries can have
strategic and inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions. Migrants make an incentivized decision over
how much of a cash windfall to remit, and recipients decide how they will spend a remittance. Migrants
strategically send home less when their choice is not revealed to recipients. Recipients make spending
choices closer to migrants' preferences when the migrants' preferences are shared, regardless of whether
or not the spending choices are revealed to the migrants, suggesting that recipients' choices are inadver-
tently affected by imperfect information.
© 2014 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).1. Introduction and motivation
Although the implications of asymmetric information have been
well documented in the study of economic institutions such as labor,
credit, and insurancemarkets, theoreticalmodels of intra-household re-
source allocation have largely assumed perfect information (Chiappori,
1988, 1992; Lundberg and Pollack, 1993; Manser and Brown, 1980;
McElroy and Horney, 1981).1 Despite this, a growing body of empirical
literature has shown that information asymmetries do exist in house-
holds and, further, that household members take strategic advantage
of these asymmetries to alter the allocation of resources in the house-
hold. For example, Ashraf (2009) shows that in the Philippines, men
hide income from their wives when that decision is private and divertl Food Policy Research Institute.
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. This is an open access article underincome to committed consumption when their decision is public. Only
when spouses communicate about their choices before they make
them do men choose to share the income with their wives. This paper
brings the study of how information asymmetries affect intra-
household resource allocation to a different setting: transnational
households, deﬁned as households composed of international migrants
and their family members in the home country, in this case El Salvador.
Using experimental methods, I examine the effects of a set of informa-
tion imperfections on remittance decisions in a matched sample of mi-
grants from El Salvador and their family members at home.
I address two types of information asymmetries that may affect deci-
sions about the sending and spending of remittances. The ﬁrst are
asymmetries that can lead to strategic behavior, meaning that migrants
and recipients recognize that the asymmetry exists and use it for their
beneﬁt. The speciﬁc asymmetries considered here are the limited abilities
of remittance recipients to observemigrant income andofmigrants to ob-
serve recipient spending. The second type are those that canhave inadver-
tent impacts, deﬁned as asymmetries that unintentionally affect decisions.
These asymmetries are represented here as communication barriers that
result in recipients having an incomplete understanding of migrant pref-
erences for how the remittances they send should be spent. Communica-
tion barriers should be interpreted broadly as any obstacle—social,
ﬁnancial, or logistical—to understanding these preferences.
The context of transnational households is signiﬁcant because mi-
grants and their family members are making ﬁnancial decisions in athe CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
2 Recruitment methods and locations were very similar to those successfully used in
Ashraf et al. (forthcoming).
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the distance separating familymembers. A number of studies have doc-
umented the existence of these asymmetries in households with mi-
grants. De Laat (2014) shows that domestic migrants in Kenya spend
resources on costly monitoring of their wives. Chen (2013) ﬁnds that
in China, wives with migrant husbands exhibit non-cooperative behav-
ior more often for activities that aremore difﬁcult tomonitor. McKenzie
et al. (2013) ﬁnd that potential Tongan migrants underestimate earn-
ings in New Zealand, a fact the authors partly attribute to
underreporting of earnings by migrants. Among Indian migrants in
Qatar, Seshan and Yang (2014) ﬁnd evidence that migrants underesti-
mate how much their wives at home are saving, and Seshan and
Zubrickas (2014) show that the underreporting of husband's income
abroad bywives is correlatedwith lower remittances. However, the em-
pirical analysis in these papers is largely observational. This is the ﬁrst
study to causally examine how information asymmetries directly affect
behavior, speciﬁcally decisions about the sending and spending of
remittances.
The importance of understanding how information asymmetries af-
fect decisions in transnational households is heightened by the fact that
migrants and their family members are ﬁnancially linked through the
sending of remittances. In 2010, aggregate remittances to the develop-
ing world were US$332 billion, and in El Salvador remittances received
were 16% of GDP (Ratha and Silwal, 2012). Additionally, the receipt of
remittances has been shown to have positive impacts on a variety of
measures of well-being (Adams and Cuecuecha, 2010; Adams and
Page, 2005; Cox Edwards and Ureta, 2003; Woodruff and Zenteno,
2007; Yang, 2008; Yang and Martinez, 2005). Given this importance of
remittances in developing countries, a more complete understanding
of how remittance decisions are made is crucial for policymakers who
are hoping to maximize their economic impact.
A growing experimental literature related to remittances and infor-
mation has focused on the strategic efforts of migrants to control remit-
tance spending. Speciﬁcally, several ﬁeld experiments have examined
the effects of offering migrants varying degrees of control over
remittances. The idea behind these experiments is that offering control
to migrants will mitigate a moral hazard problem in how recipients
spend remittances. Studies have found mixed results. Ashraf et al.
(forthcoming) show that savings levels in bank accounts in El Salvador in-
crease whenmigrants are given greater control over these accounts. Chin
et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the impacts of an experiment that offeredmigrants
assistance in opening bank accounts in the United States are concentrated
among migrants who report having no control over how their remit-
tances are spent. However, in a lab experiment, Torero and Viceisza
(2013) do not ﬁnd that Salvadoran migrants send more when they are
able to control how remittances are spent, and attribute this to the fact
that the control offered by their experiment was too limiting. Additional-
ly, Ambler et al. (forthcoming)ﬁndnounsubsidizeddemand for a product
that directs remittances to education andDeArcangelis et al. (2014) show
evidence that simply labeling remittances for education is as effective in
increasing remittances as providing a hard commitment device.
A limitation of the papers described above is that they do not con-
sider that information problems might run in both directions. One of
the principal contributions of this paper is therefore that it examines
the strategic impacts of information asymmetries on both sides of
the migrant–recipient relationship. The observational studies
documenting information asymmetries in migrant households have
also largely focused on migrant monitoring of recipient behavior
(Chen, 2013; de Laat, 2014) and none examine the decisions of
both migrants and recipients.
This study also ﬁts into the literature that describes information
asymmetries and strategic behavior in families that live in closer
proximity. In addition to the previously described Ashraf (2009)
study in the Philippines, Schaner (forthcoming) ﬁnds that spouses
are more likely to choose to save in individual (as opposed to joint)
savings accounts when they are not well informed about each other'sﬁnances. Also related, Jakiela and Ozier (2012) ﬁnd that women in
Kenya sacriﬁce investment returns to keep income secret from fam-
ily members outside their household and avoid the pressure to share
that income. Ashraf et al. (2014), Castilla and Walker (2013), and
Hoel (2014) also ﬁnd evidence of strategic effects of information
asymmetries between spouses.
An additional contribution of this paper is that it also addresses
the inadvertent impacts of information asymmetries, which have
been studied much less. In a ﬁeld experiment with migrants in
Ireland, Batista and Narciso (2013) ﬁnd that providing migrants
with free phone calls to their home country increases both commu-
nication with family members and remittances. However, although
this experiment lowers communication costs, it cannot identify
whether the information asymmetry alleviated was strategic or in-
advertent. For example, increased communication may have given
migrants better information about recipient needs, but it also may
have reduced the ability of migrants to strategically underreport
their income. Similarly, the communication treatment in Ashraf
(2009) allows spouses to discuss their decisions, and therefore can-
not distinguish a strategic bargaining effect from an alleviation of
an inadvertent information barrier.
The experiments in this paper explicitly test for both strategic and
inadvertent responses to information asymmetries. Theywere designed
to mimic real-life decisions about remittances made by migrants and
their family members, and by randomly assigning treatments, I am
able to causally identify the impacts of the informational conditions
being tested. The ﬁrst experiment was conducted among Salvadoran
migrants recruited in the Washington, DC, area.2 The migrants were
asked how much of a possible $600 lottery prize they wished to keep
and how much they wished to send to a family member in El
Salvador. Participants had the chance to win the allocation that they
chose. To test whether migrants strategically react to changes in
the observability of their income, they were randomly allocated
into two treatment groups: those whose decisions were revealed to
their families back home (and the migrants were told their decisions
would be revealed), and those whose decisions were not revealed to
their families at home (and, similarly, the migrants were told their
decisions would remain private). Although the choice was described
to the migrant as a remittance decision, it should be noted that the
migrant experiment is essentially a version of the classic dictator
game where one player allocates a sum of money between him or
herself and a recipient.
The migrants' family members in El Salvador (referred to
throughout the paper as “recipients”) then participated in a second
experiment. They made a decision about how to spend a possible
$300 lottery prize. This prize was referred to as a remittance and re-
cipients were told that they were eligible for this remittance because
their migrant family member was participating in the study. To test
for strategic reactions to the observability of their spending choices,
as in the migrant experiment half of the recipients were told that
their choice would not be revealed to the migrant, and the other
half were told that their choice would be revealed. In a second
cross-randomized treatment addressing the inadvertent effects of
communication barriers, half of the recipients were informed of the
migrant's preferences for how the money should be spent, and the
others were not. These preferences were collected from migrants
during the migrant survey, following the conclusion of the migrant
experiment described above. In order to avoid the migrant experi-
ment inﬂuencing the results of the recipient experiment, the infor-
mation revelations about choices made in the migrant experiment
and the awarding of all prizes were conducted after the conclusion
of both experiments.
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$600 lottery prize (an increase of 5% over the control group mean of
$440 sent) when their decisions are revealed. I additionally report sug-
gestive evidence that this effect is concentrated among migrants whose
baseline characteristics indicate that they may be likely to react strategi-
cally to the opportunity to hide income from their family members.
These characteristics include time spent in the United States, relationship
between the recipient and the migrant, whether the migrant has a child
22 or under in El Salvador, frequency of communication between themi-
grant and the recipient, and remittances sent by themigrant to the recip-
ient. There is no corresponding evidence of strategic behavior in the
recipient experiment. Therefore, despite the focus onmigrantmonitoring
of recipient behavior in the existing literature, Iﬁnd thatmigrants, but not
recipients, react strategically towhether or not their choiceswill bemon-
itored. In the second recipient treatment reducing communication costs
by revealing migrant preferences to recipients does have an impact,
resulting in a 10% reduction in the difference between migrant prefer-
ences and recipient choices. The effect is present even when recipient
choices are not revealed to migrants. This result demonstrates that infor-
mation barriers can have inadvertent impacts on remittance decisions.
In addition to its principal contributions to the literature on informa-
tion issues in migrant families, this study also builds on the existing
household literature more generally. For example, most papers focus on
only a single choice in the resource allocation process, and the present ex-
periment considers how information asymmetries can affect a sequence
of two different decisions made by families about economic resources.
Additionally, this study documents that information asymmetries can
be important outside of the husband–wife pair, which has been the con-
text of most previous experimental work in this area.3 People in develop-
ing countries often transfer resources within extended families, and
therefore decisions about resource allocation are likely to involve people
beyond just the husband and wife. These results show that information
asymmetries can have important impacts in extended families.
Because the designof themigrant experiment is essentially amodiﬁed
dictator game it is also important to understand how this study differs
from the extensive existing literature on dictator games. Dictator games
are generally used as a test for altruistic behavior and are played anony-
mously, with neither the dictator nor the recipient knowing the identity
of the other. Results generally show that dictators deviate from pure
self-interest and allocate around 20% of the available funds to the recipi-
ent (Camerer, 2003; Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008). Studies have shown
that both making the identity of the recipient known to the dictator and
revealing the dictator choices to the recipient substantially raise giving
(Bohnet and Frey, 1999; Leider et al., 2009; Ligon and Schechter, 2012).
The migrant experiment can be thought of as a dictator game with
known recipients that studies the impact of revealing dictator choices
similar to studies such as Leider et al. (2009) and Ligon and Schechter
(2012). However, the literature has also shown that the culture of the
participants and the framing of the game can have large effects on
choices made (Cardenas and Carpenter, 2008; Henrich et al., 2005;
Levitt and List, 2007). Therefore, given the study population and the
framing of the game as a remittance decision, the results cannot neces-
sarily be predicted based on previous studies. Additionally, a unique el-
ement of this experiment is that dictator games are not normally run
among people who regularly transfer large sums of money to each
other. Therefore, this study provides a setting in which the results of
the game can bemore closely linked to behavior outside the experimen-
tal setting.43 The dynamics of transfer arrangements in extended family networks has been studied
(Foster and Rosenzweig, 2001), but little is known about how information imperfections
affect behavior in these arrangements. The notable exception is Jakiela and Ozier (2012),
but themain focus of that paper is investment decisions, as opposed to sharing and spend-
ing decisions.
4 Torero and Viceisza (2013) and De Arcangelis et al. (2014) also play remittance dicta-
tor games, but the focus of those studies was migrant control of remittance spending.The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes a simple concep-
tual framework. Section 3 explains the experimental design. Section 4
describes the data and the empirical strategy. Section 5 presents the re-
sults, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Framework
2.1. Migrant decision
In this section I describe a simple economic framework that moti-
vates the experimental design. The migrant's decision about how
much to send home in remittances is driven by two factors: altruism to-
wards the recipient and additional costs that vary with the remittance
amount. These costs are broadly construed and meant to encompass
most other motivations for sending remittances previously considered
in the literature.5 The idea is that migrants are compelled to send
more in remittances than they would choose to if simply motivated by
altruismbecause theywant to avoid incurring these costs. One example
of such a cost is social sanctions against the migrant: many migrants
come from areas with strong social norms regarding remittances and
particularly for migrants who wish to return home one day, a dam-
aged reputation could be quite costly. Empirical support for social
norms and recipient pressure driving remittances includes De
Weerdt and Hirvonen (2013) and De Weerdt et al. (2014). Another
example is substandard care for people (children or elderly rela-
tives) or possessions (land, livestock, or new investments) left by
the migrant in the care of his family. Migrants who fail to send
home as much money as their families expect may also damage
their relationships with their families. Conversely, migrants may
also incur a beneﬁt from appearing fair or altruistic towards their
family members (Bénabou and Tirole, 2006) which could lead them
to send larger amounts.6
The expected remittance payment depends on the recipient's per-
ception of the migrant's incomes. For example, if migrants are earning
more, social norms may dictate that larger amounts should be sent
home. Similarly, recipients will perceive migrants to be more altruistic
the larger the proportion of their overall income that is remitted. The
extent to which recipients have knowledge of migrants' true incomes
will vary. In some circumstances recipients may have independent in-
formation about how much the migrant has earned,7 but in many
cases theymust rely only onwhat themigrant has told them. Therefore,
migrants for whom these costs are important can strategically take ad-
vantage of situationswhere recipients cannot observe their true income
to underreport their earnings and send less home.
2.2. Recipient decision
The decision made by recipients about how to spend the remit-
tances that they receive is considered in a parallel manner to the mi-
grant sending decision. Recipients choose the extent to which they
follow the migrants' preferences for how remittances should be
spent. Their choice is motivated by altruism (in this case simply the
extent to which recipients want to follow migrant preferences) and
other costs related to the recipient's decision. For example, failure
to comply with migrant preferences could lead to a reduction inThis idea of altruistic remittances coexistingwith othermotives iswell explored in the
literature. See for example, Lucas and Stark (1985). Rapoport and Docquier (2006) review
the economic literature on remittance motivations and Carling (2014) synthesizes the
ethnographic literature.
6 For ease of exposition, I will use the term cost throughout the text, but the reader
should keep in mind that this cost could be negative (i.e. a beneﬁt).
7 This observation of income will likely occur through the migrant's social and family
network. Given that the networks within which migrants in the United States live and
work are often closely related to their home country networks (Munshi, 2003), instances
when the probability that income will be observed is quite high are likely.
9 Surveyors report very few cases of participants requesting this information. The ﬁrst
prize was awarded midway through survey work, and the second when survey work
had concluded. Migrants were eligible for only one drawing.
10 As noted earlier, twomigrant prizeswere given out. Participants were informed of the
number of prizes and the dates of the drawings if they asked. Surveyors report that very
few participants inquired, so in practice most participants did not know the odds of
winning.
11 This method should not be confused with the commonmethod used in economic ex-
periments inwhich participants complete a number of different tasks and one is randomly
chosen to be paid out.
12 Despite its widespread use, it is important to consider how the lottery mechanism
may affect respondent choices. Studies that directly examine how using lotteries affects
choices have yielded mixed results. Baltussen et al. (2012) ﬁnd that subjects appear to
be less risk averse when lotteries are used and Sefton (1992) ﬁnds that subjects are more
generous. Conversely, Bolle (1990) ﬁnds no difference in decisions between guaranteed
payouts and those determined by lottery. However, all of this work has examined choices
under low to medium stakes; there has been no systematic study comparing guaranteed
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ents can therefore strategically take advantage of circumstances
when their spending is unobservable by spending less money ac-
cording to migrant preferences.
The recipient decision may additionally be complicated by barriers
to communication that result in confusion overwhat themigrant's pref-
erences actually are. I will refer to these barriers as communication costs,
but the concept is broader than the cost of a telephone call. With dis-
tance, speciﬁcity about preferences may become difﬁcult, migrants
may feel uncomfortable expressing what they want, and recipients
may sometimes have tomake decisionswithout time to directly consult
with migrants. Family members may also incorrectly assume that they
know what the migrant would prefer. If the recipient does not know
the migrant's preferences, the preferences will not be followed regard-
less of the recipient's intentions.
3. Experimental design
Given that information asymmetries in transnational families are
difﬁcult to measure and may be correlated with a number of unob-
served characteristics, I implement a randomized experiment to test
for their strategic and inadvertent impacts. This experiment is conduct-
ed within the context of survey work for a separate ﬁeld experiment on
remittances and education among Salvadoran migrants in Washington,
DC, and their families in El Salvador (Ambler et al., forthcoming). The
details of the companion experiment are described in Appendix A.
This data collection exercise involves surveys withmatched pairs of mi-
grants and family members, allowing me to investigate the preferences
and choices of both. In the experiment, I randomly vary (1)whethermi-
grant income and recipient spending are observed and (2) the size of
communication costs, allowing me to identify the causal impacts of
both of these factors on migrant and recipient remittance behavior.
The ﬁrst variation tests for strategic reactions to information
asymmetries, while the second looks for inadvertent impacts.
Migrantswere recruited in theWashington, DC,metro area at the two
area locations of the Salvadoran consulate and were interviewed while
theywerewaiting for consular services. Themigrant surveywas conduct-
ed between late September 2011 and late February 2012. Surveyors in the
consulate approached migrants and invited them to participate. Because
the focus of the companion experiment was remittances and education,
participants were required to name a high school or college-aged relative
or acquaintance in El Salvador. Those who qualiﬁed and agreed to partic-
ipate were administered a baseline survey. The migrant experiment de-
scribed in this paper was conducted at the end of the survey. Following
the experiment, the migrants responded to an additional question to be
used in the recipient experiment.8
During the survey migrants identiﬁed a high school or college-aged
student in El Salvador. Interviews were subsequently conducted with
the student or a household member. If the student was 18 years of age
or older, the student was to be interviewed; and if under 18, a guardian
was identiﬁed to be interviewed. If the indicatedpersonwasnot available,
an alternative adult in the household was interviewed. The El Salvador
surveywas conducted by phone in the days following themigrant survey
in the United States; the median number of days between surveys was
eight. The El Salvador surveys concluded in mid-March 2012, two
weeks after ﬁeldwork ended in the United States. The experiment in the
El Salvador survey was also at the end of the survey. Fig. 1 describes the
phases of the project in the order that they occurred for each pair of
participants.
The randomization in this study was performed at the participant
level. Surveys were pre-assigned treatment status, and randomization8 This was followed by the offer of a product designed to facilitate the sending of remit-
tances for education. This was a randomized intervention, and migrants received offers of
different versions of the product depending on their assigned treatment group. Migrants
in a control group received only information and no product offer.for all treatments was stratiﬁed within groups of 16 surveys and by
the treatment offered in the companion experiment. The recipient treat-
ments were additionally stratiﬁed by the migrant treatment.
3.1. Migrant experiment
The migrant experiment consisted of an incentivized remittance-
sending decision. Migrants were told that they were being given the
chance to win a $600 lottery and would have to decide how much of
the prize to keep for themselves and how much to remit to their family
member in El Salvador. Migrants could split the $600 as they wished
but were restricted to using $100 intervals for simplicity. The prize was
awarded through a lottery and two prizes were given out. If asked, sur-
veyors told migrants the number of prizes and the date of the drawing.9
More than half themigrantswhoparticipated in this study report earning
less than $400 a week. Consequently, $600 represents a signiﬁcant in-
crease inmonthly income. The question text can be found in Appendix B.
Migrants were randomly allocated into two groups: those who were
told that their choice would be revealed to their family member, and
those who were told that their choice would not be revealed. For those
in the choice revealed treatment group, all recipientswere to be informed
about themigrant's choice, regardless ofwhether or not theywon the lot-
tery. Recipients in the choice not revealed groupwere told nothing about
the migrant experiment unless the migrant won the lottery and had
elected to send the recipient some or all of the $600. The family member
referred to in the questionwas the person to be surveyed in El Salvador. A
description of the treatments is presented in Fig. 2. Because the treatment
varies the ability of the recipient to monitor the migrant's actions, I refer
to this treatment as the migrant monitoring treatment.
This experiment exogenously varies the probability that recipients
will observemigrant income andmeasures the extent to whichmigrants
strategically take advantage of asymmetric information. The framework
described in Section 2predicts thatmigrantswhose choice is not revealed
to the recipient should send less than those whose choice is revealed.
Because the prize was awarded through a lottery, participants were
not guaranteed any winnings and the expected value of the prize for
each participant was quite low.10 As the goal of the experiments was
to emulate real life remittance decisions it was necessary to use
money amounts that were close in magnitude to the sums participants
would be considering when making these real life decisions. Given the
average size of remittance payments in this population and budgetary
restrictions, the lottery method was the only feasible method of
conducting the study. This method has been used in many prior studies
such as Armantier (2006), Murnighan and Saxon (1998), Ockenfels and
Warner (2012), and Straub andMurnighan (1995). It has also been used
speciﬁcally in studies that modeled remittances (De Arcangelis et al.,
2014; Torero and Viceisza, 2013).,11 12payoffs to lottery payoffs at high stakes similar to the ones used in this paper. Laury
(2005) shows that respondents make the same choices when low stakes payoffs are ran-
dom as when payoffs are guaranteed. However, a separate treatment in which payoffs
were random but stakes were increased by ten did change behavior, suggesting that cali-
brating the face value of the prize may be the most important consideration.
Fig. 1. Project timeline.
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The recipient experiment consisted of an incentivized remittance
spending decision. The respondents in the El Salvador phone survey
were told that because their family member in the United States partic-
ipated in the study, they nowhad the chance towin a lottery for a remit-
tance worth $300. They had to decide what to spend the remittance on
and were asked to split the $300 among four spending categories: res-
taurant meals, education, daily expenses, and health expenses. Recipi-
ent choices were limited to four categories for simplicity in the
context of a phone survey. Immediately following the migrant experi-
ment, during the US survey (which occurred prior to the recipient inter-
view), all migrants were told about the lottery for recipients and asked
what their preferences were for how the recipients would spend the
money.13 This knowledge of the migrants' preferences will allow for a
direct examination of how closely recipients adhere to these
preferences.
Those recipients who won the lottery received exactly the alloca-
tions that they requested. Four prizes were awarded. If asked, sur-
veyors told the recipients the number of prizes and the date of the
drawing.14 Prizes were awarded in kind and respondents were held
to the choices that they made. In practice this meant that project
staff coordinated the delivery of the selected prize with each lottery
winner on a case by case basis. Some choice was permitted within
the categories the recipients had chosen but they could not request
prizes outside of those categories. The median monthly remittance
reported by participating migrants is $220, so a $300 remittance is
a reasonable amount for many recipients. The question text can be
found in Appendix B. Two separate, cross-randomized treatments
were administered to recipients: the recipient monitoring treatment
and the recipient communication treatment. They are depicted in
Fig. 3.3.3. Recipient monitoring treatment
The recipient monitoring treatment is parallel to the migrant
monitoring treatment. Recipients were randomly allocated into
two groups: those whowere told that their choice would be revealed
to the migrant, and those who were told that their choice would not
be revealed to the migrant. Recipients knew that all migrants in the
choice revealed treatment would be informed of their decision
whether or not they won the lottery. Migrants in the choice not re-
vealed group were told nothing. This treatment randomly varied13 The time atwhich this interaction occurred relative to the other components of the ex-
periments is depicted in Figs. 1 and 2.
14 Surveyors report very few cases of participants requesting this information. Two
prizes were awarded midway through survey work and the other two when survey work
had concluded. Recipients were eligible for only one drawing.the probability that recipient spending would be observed and mea-
sures the extent to which recipients strategically take advantage of
this asymmetric information. Following the conceptual framework,
the results of the experiment should show that recipients make
choices closer to migrant preferences when those choices are re-
vealed to the migrant.
3.4. Recipient communication treatment
As described above, during the US survey, migrants were told about
the lottery for recipients and askedwhat their preferenceswere for how
the recipients would spend the money. This information is utilized as
part of this treatment. Recipients were randomly allocated into two
groups: those for whom the migrant's preferences were revealed and
those for whom the migrant's preferences were not revealed. Making
these preferences clear is a proxy for improving communication, so
the experiment exogenously improves communication about migrant
preferences for expenditures. Revealing migrant preferences to the re-
cipient should decrease the difference between the recipients' choices
and the migrants' preferences when communication problems exist.
This treatmentwas designed as a test of whether or not communica-
tion costs can lead to inadvertent deviation frommigrant preferences by
the recipient. In order to make this argument convincing it is necessary
to consider its interactionwith themonitoring treatment. Speciﬁcally, if
recipients are both uninformed and strategic, one would expect to only
see effects for those recipients who are both told the migrants' prefer-
ences and told that their choices will be revealed. Conversely, a pure in-
advertent effect can only be identiﬁed if there is an effect of the
communication treatment for those recipients whose choices were not
revealed to the migrant.
4. Data and estimation strategy
4.1. Data
Table 1 shows summary statistics from both the migrant and the re-
cipient surveys: 1581migrant surveys and 1298 recipient surveys were
performed, a completion rate of 82% for the recipient surveys. For the
migrant survey, summary statistics are shown for both the full sample
and the samplewith completed recipient surveys. Because nomeaning-
ful differences are evident between the two samples, I limit the analysis
sample to the migrant–recipient pairs with completed El Salvador sur-
veys. Results from the migrant experiment are similar across the two
samples. The ﬁrst row of Table 2 shows that attrition from the full sam-
ple ofmigrants to the estimation sample ofmigrant–recipient pairswith
completed recipient surveys is not related to treatment. The breakdown
of participants in the analysis sample into the different treatment
groups can be seen in Fig. 2 (migrant experiment) and Fig. 3 (recipient
experiment).
Fig. 3. Recipient experiment.
Fig. 2.Migrant experiment.
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number of years in the United States is 11, so themigrants are largely
established in the United States. 32% of migrants report having a son
or daughter aged 22 or under in El Salvador, and 69% report commu-
nicating with the recipient household at least weekly. The sample is
also low income; half of the migrants earn $400 a week or less. Be-
cause of the structure of the project, the interviewed recipients are
either the student identiﬁed by the migrant (45%) or the student's
guardian if the student is under 18 (40%). The remaining 15% of in-
terviews were done with a different adult in the household if the stu-
dent or guardian could not be reached. The recipient sample is
heavily female (68%) because identiﬁed student guardians tend to
be female.
Because migrants were screened into the study on the basis of hav-
ing a young adult relative in El Salvador, it is possible that the respon-
dents are not representative of the larger migrant community. This
concern is heightened by the fact that many migrants were not eligible
to participate because they did not know a student of the appropriate
age. During recruitment, among the migrants approached 24% partici-
pated. Of those that did not participate, a considerable majority, 77%,
did not know an eligible student in El Salvador.15 To address the exter-
nal validity of the sample, in Appendix Table 1, I compare characteristics
of the migrants from the survey (gender, age, time in the United States,
household size, and education) tomigrants in the 2008–2010 American
Community Survey (ACS) (Ruggles et al., 2010). I restrict the ACS sam-
ple to Salvadoran-born, non-US citizens aged 18 to 65 in the Washing-
ton, DC metro area. The study participants are quite similar to the ACS
sample, suggesting that study participants are not overly different
from the greater migrant population. However, while this comparison
is useful it also does not cover a wide range of other characteristics.
Therefore, the results of the experiments must be interpreted with the
caveat that they were obtained using a selected sample. For example,
given the screening criteria, this sample may have a greater interest in
education than the average migrant in this area.
A related concern is that even if the migrants themselves are similar
to the broader population of migrants in the area, the student age re-
quirement results in migrants naming El Salvador households with
which they are not typically in a remittance relationship. The evidence
from the baseline survey refutes this. 85% of migrants have remitted
to the recipient household in the past year and 78% of recipients are
members of the migrant's home household in El Salvador. 64% send
more to the recipient household than other households, indicating
that the recipient household is the primary remittance recipient in the15 14% refused, 7% were not from El Salvador, and 2% had other reasons.majority of cases. I also examine the relationship of the migrant to the
recipient. A tabulation of these relationships is presented in Appendix
Table 2. Almost all recipients are family members, and approximately
80% are parents, children, siblings, nieces or nephews, or cousins. The
evidence is convincing that the sample is largely composed of mi-
grant–recipient pairs involved in established remittance relationships,
therefore making it an appropriate sample within which to study ques-
tions of information asymmetries.
Table 2 tests whether the treatment groups are balanced on ob-
served characteristics from the baseline survey for both the migrant
and the recipient experiment. Themeans by treatment group in themi-
grant monitoring treatment are presented in the ﬁrst two columns, and
the p-value of the test of whether or not those means are equal is in the
third column. Overall, the treatment groups are well balanced: only 2 of
34 differences are signiﬁcantly different from zero at the 10 percent
level. Columns four through nine show the means by treatment group
for the two recipient treatments and p-values for differences in those
means. Only three of the 34 p-values for the recipient monitoring treat-
ment and one for the recipient communication treatment are less than
0.10.
4.2. Estimation strategy: migrant experiment
The results of themigrant experiment can be analyzed by estimating
the following regression using ordinary least squares:
Remiti ¼ δþ αChoiceRevealedi þ γi þ εi ð1Þ
where Remiti is the dependent variable indicating the amount that the
migrant chose to send to the recipient. ChoiceRevealedi is the treatment
indicator for the monitoring treatment, and it is equal to one when the
migrant's choice is revealed to the recipient. The coefﬁcient α is the av-
erage difference between how much migrants choose to send when
their decisions are not revealed and when they are revealed. γi are the
stratiﬁcation cell ﬁxed effects. There are 111 survey group stratiﬁcation
cells in all regressions. I also include speciﬁcations with controls. The
control variables include migrant age, gender, education, household
size, years in the United States, remittances to recipient household,
and other migrant background characteristics. εi is the error term,
which I adjust for heteroskedasticity.
4.3. Estimation strategy: recipient experiment
The recipient experimentwas designed to understand the impacts of
information asymmetries on the extent to which recipients follow mi-
grant preferences for the expenditures of remittances. Because the
Table 1
Baseline summary statistics.
All observations Observations with completed recipient
survey
Mean SD N Mean SD N
Baseline variables from migrant survey
Migrant is female 0.50 0.50 1581 0.51 0.50 1298
Migrant age 36.83 9.41 1538 36.92 9.29 1264
Migrant can read and write 0.96 0.20 1554 0.96 0.20 1275
Migrant's years of education 9.08 4.67 1560 9.01 4.67 1282
Migrant's years in the US 11.31 6.38 1577 11.13 6.27 1295
Migrant is married 0.62 0.48 1575 0.63 0.48 1294
Migrant lives with spouse 0.49 0.50 1579 0.50 0.50 1296
Migrant's total number of children 2.28 1.69 1579 2.34 1.69 1296
Migrant's number of children in El Salvador 1.01 1.43 1577 1.07 1.47 1294
Migrant's number of children in US 1.26 1.32 1575 1.25 1.29 1293
Migrant's hh size in US 4.32 1.98 1581 4.36 1.96 1298
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador 0.32 0.47 1581 0.34 0.47 1298
Recipient is migrant's close relative 0.29 0.45 1574 0.31 0.46 1291
Migrant has worked in last 12 months 0.89 0.31 1581 0.89 0.31 1298
Migrant in lowest income bracket 0.52 0.50 1429 0.53 0.50 1181
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh 0.85 0.36 1580 0.87 0.34 1297
Migrant's annual regular remittances to recipient hh ($) 2298 2907 1565 2440 2998 1283
Migrant's annual irregular remittances to recipient hh ($) 337 706 1575 344 707 1293
Migrant's annual total remittances to recipient hh ($) 2629 3199 1563 2777 3284 1281
Migrant's annual total remittances to other hhs ($) 1097 1905 1567 1123 1944 1284
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly 0.69 0.46 1578 0.71 0.45 1295
Baseline variables from recipient survey
Recipient is target student 0.45 0.50 1298
Recipient is student's guardian 0.40 0.49 1298
Recipient is female 0.68 0.47 1298
Recipient age 34.20 15.84 1295
Recipient is married 0.36 0.48 1298
Recipient's years of education 9.37 5.27 1292
Recipient lives in urban area 0.43 0.50 1298
Recipient's hh size 4.99 2.04 1296
Annual remittances received from migrant ($) 1522 1916 1203
Baseline comparison variables
Migrant and recipient report same hh budget priorities 0.48 0.50 1231
Migrant and recipient report same student GPA 0.24 0.43 1041
Migrant and recipient report same student mode of transport 0.43 0.50 1107
Notes: Samples are observationswith non-missing data for questions in themigrant experiment. Completed recipient survey sample additionally conditions on completion of the recipient
survey and non-missingmigrant and recipient information for questions in the recipient experiment. The number of observations varies slightly with missing values. Recipient is deﬁned
as a close relative if migrant reports recipient to be spouse, parent or child. Migrants in the lowest income bracket chose $400 or less as the weekly income of themselves plus their co-
resident spouses. The other categories were $401–600, $601–800, and $801 and above. Annual regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and
the average amount sent each time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. The recipient variables in all cases refer to the person complet-
ing the recipient survey. The baseline comparison variableswere asked on both surveys and are equal to one if themigrant and recipient responsesmatch. Both respondentswere asked to
choose the three most important budget priorities for the recipient household from a list of seven categories. Student refers to the student identiﬁed by the migrant during the baseline
survey. GPA and mode of transport were only asked when the student was reported to be in school.
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choices for all participants, it is possible to directly examine this param-
eter by comparing migrant preferences with recipient choices. I imple-
ment this by calculating the absolute value of the difference between
the recipient's choice and the migrant's preference in each category. I
also create a summary measure across the four categories by summing
the difference variables and dividing by 2 to scale the total to 300. I
refer to this as the total difference, and it is the primary dependent var-
iable of interest. It is a measure of the number of dollars out of the $300
on whichmigrant and recipient choices match. For example, a total dif-
ference of 100 would mean the recipient's choices matched the
migrant's preferences on $200 of the $300, but that they allocated the
remaining $100 to different categories.1616 The success of this strategy depends on migrant preferences being balanced at base-
line. There are no signiﬁcant differences between treatment groups for either recipient
treatment for migrant responses across the four spending groups.An alternative estimation strategy would be to examine average
recipient allocations to each spending category. However, in order
to detect treatment effects using this strategy, migrant and recipi-
ent preferences would have to be different in the sample on aver-
age, for example if migrants overall preferred education while
recipients preferred daily expenses. If migrants and recipients in-
stead have approximately the same preferences on average, these
averages can conceal substantial within-pair disagreement. Exami-
nation of only changes in average recipient allocations may then
mask substantial changes in recipient behavior that will be evident
when analyzing within-pair differences. Consequently, I focus on
the pair-level differences, but discuss the impacts on average re-
cipient allocations in Appendix C.
The recipient experiment can be analyzed by estimating the follow-
ing regression:
Differencei ¼ φþ β1ChoiceRevealedi þ β2PreferenceRevealediþ
β3ChoiceRevealedi  PreferenceRevealedi þ θi þ μ i
ð2Þ
Table 2
Balance tests.
Migrant experiment Recipient experiment: monitoring
treatment
Recipient experiment: communication
treatment
Treatment group means:
migrant choice…
P-value for
difference
of means
Treatment group means:
recipient choice…
P-value for
difference
of means
Treatment group means:
migrant preference…
P-value for
difference
of means
…Not revealed
to recipient
…Revealed
to recipient
…Not revealed
to migrant
…Revealed
to migrant
…Not revealed
to recipient
…Revealed
to recipient
Attrition
Recipient survey completed 0.82 0.83 0.819 0.81 0.83 0.315 0.82 0.83 0.730
Baseline variables from US survey
Migrant is female 0.53 0.49 0.165 0.52 0.50 0.532 0.49 0.53 0.186
Migrant age 36.90 36.94 0.941 36.56 37.27 0.176 36.90 36.95 0.922
Migrant can read and write 0.95 0.97 0.150 0.95 0.96 0.461 0.96 0.95 0.295
Migrant's years of education 9.01 9.00 0.966 9.02 9.00 0.947 8.97 9.04 0.798
Migrant's years in the US 10.90 11.37 0.178 11.18 11.08 0.774 11.13 11.13 0.993
Migrant is married 0.61 0.65 0.151 0.65 0.61 0.175 0.63 0.63 0.952
Migrant lives with spouse 0.50 0.50 0.956 0.51 0.49 0.543 0.50 0.50 0.957
Migrant's total number of children 2.34 2.34 0.956 2.30 2.38 0.352 2.37 2.31 0.560
Migrant's number of children in El Salvador 1.03 1.10 0.365 1.01 1.12 0.206 1.04 1.09 0.557
Migrant's number of children in US 1.28 1.22 0.410 1.27 1.24 0.725 1.31 1.20 0.105
Migrant's hh size in US 4.34 4.38 0.720 4.43 4.29 0.183 4.43 4.29 0.214
Migrant has child 22 or under in El Salvador 0.32 0.37 0.059 0.33 0.35 0.366 0.34 0.34 0.885
Recipient is migrant's close relative 0.29 0.33 0.178 0.30 0.32 0.539 0.34 0.29 0.059
Migrant has worked in last 12 months 0.90 0.89 0.943 0.89 0.90 0.401 0.89 0.89 0.950
Migrant in lowest income bracket 0.53 0.53 0.886 0.51 0.54 0.229 0.53 0.53 0.934
Migrant sent remittances to recipient hh 0.87 0.86 0.586 0.86 0.88 0.510 0.87 0.87 0.802
Migrant's annual regular remittances to
recipient hh ($)
2494 2386 0.520 2435 2444 0.953 2315 2561 0.141
Migrant's annual irregular remittances to
recipient hh ($)
354 334 0.627 382 308 0.062 353 335 0.655
Migrant's annual total remittances to recipient
hh ($)
2828 2726 0.579 2802 2752 0.786 2648 2903 0.165
Migrant's annual total remittances to other
hhs ($)
1059 1185 0.245 1137 1110 0.804 1068 1177 0.314
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at
least weekly
0.73 0.69 0.057 0.73 0.69 0.192 0.70 0.72 0.585
Baseline variables from recipient survey
Recipient is target student 0.45 0.45 0.907 0.44 0.46 0.402 0.46 0.44 0.495
Recipient is student's guardian 0.42 0.38 0.160 0.42 0.38 0.239 0.39 0.41 0.319
Recipient is female 0.69 0.67 0.331 0.68 0.68 0.998 0.68 0.68 0.726
Recipient age 35.09 33.31 0.043 34.44 33.97 0.589 34.29 34.11 0.835
Recipient is married 0.36 0.36 0.941 0.41 0.32 0.001 0.35 0.38 0.243
Recipient's years of education 9.21 9.54 0.285 9.22 9.53 0.294 9.30 9.45 0.622
Recipient lives in urban area 0.43 0.44 0.649 0.41 0.46 0.061 0.42 0.45 0.312
Recipient's hh size 4.90 5.08 0.111 5.04 4.95 0.471 5.06 4.93 0.271
Annual remittances received frommigrant ($) 1491 1553 0.580 1534 1510 0.825 1484 1559 0.497
Notes: Samples are observationswith non-missing values for the experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Attrition ismeasured from sample of all migrants who completed
the survey and themigrant experiment to sample with completed recipient survey and recipient experiment. Sample size for each comparison of means varies slightly bymissing values
for each variable. The percentage of missing values for each variable is also tested for balance across treatment groups with no signiﬁcant differences. Other notes on variable construction
are as in Table 1. P-values come from a regression of each variable on treatment, with standard errors adjusted for heteroskedasticity.
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cipient choices in each of the four spending categories or the total differ-
ence. ChoiceRevealedi is the treatment indicator for the recipient
monitoring treatment and is equal to one when the recipient's choice
is revealed to themigrant. PreferenceRevealedi is the treatment indicator
for the communication treatment and is equal to one when the
migrant's preferences are revealed to the recipient before the recipient
decides how to allocate the remittance funds. ChoiceRevealedi *
PreferenceRevealedi is the interaction between the two treatments. If,
as predicted, revealing the recipients' choices to the migrants and com-
municating themigrants' preferences to the recipients causes the recip-
ients to make choices more similar to the migrants' preferences, even
when the other treatment has not been applied, then the difference var-
iable will be smaller in the choice revealed and preference revealed
treatment groups, and β1 and β2 should be negative. If recipients react
to being monitored more when the migrants' preferences are revealed
(in other words they are both strategic and uninformed), then theinteraction term will be important and β3 should be negative. θi are
the stratiﬁcation cell ﬁxed effects (survey group and migrant treat-
ment). I also present a speciﬁcation with control variables and use the
same variables as in themigrant experiment aswell as recipient gender,
age, education, household size, and the number of days between themi-
grant and recipient surveys. μi is the error term, which I adjust for
heteroskedasticity.
5. Results
5.1. Migrant experiment
I ﬁrst analyze the results of the migrant experiment in which mi-
grants decide how much of a potential $600 lottery prize to send to
the recipient and howmuch to keep. Fig. 4 shows the cumulative distri-
bution of the amount sent by migrants, separately by treatment group.
The ﬁrst observation to be made from this ﬁgure is that the migrants
Table 3
Impact of monitoring treatment on migrant remittance decision.
(1) (2)
Dependent variable:
amount sent by
migrant
Migrant choice revealed to recipient 20.40** 19.50*
[10.27] [10.26]
Migrant is female −26.46**
[11.09]
Migrant age −0.487
[0.741]
Migrant's years of education −0.119
[1.225]
Migrant's years in the US 1.968*
[1.071]
Migrant lives with spouse −28.75**
[11.83]
Migrant's hh size in US 1.293
[2.800]
Migrant has child 22 or under in ES 0.984
[12.41]
Recipient is migrant's close relative −0.675
[12.74]
Migrant in lowest income bracket −21.73*
[12.65]
Migrant's annual total remittances to recipient hh 0.00319*
[0.00192]
Migrant communicates with recipient hh at least weekly −1.122
[12.68]
Observations 1298 1298
R-squared 0.133 0.159
Mean in migrant choice not revealed to recipient 441.4
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Samples are observations with non-
missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Amount
sent by migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when splitting $600
between themselves and recipients. All regressions include stratiﬁcation group
ﬁxed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which ran-
domization was stratiﬁed. Recipient is deﬁned as close relative if migrant reports re-
cipient to be his spouse, parent or child. Migrants in the lowest income bracket chose
$400 or less as the weekly income of themselves plus their co-resident spouses. The
other categories were $401–600, $601–800 and $801 and above. Annual total remit-
tances are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual regular re-
mittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the
average amount sent each time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent
for special occasions or emergencies.
***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
Fig. 4. Cumulative distribution of amount sent by migrant by treatment group.
18 Given that these variables generally indicate a stronger or closer relationship between
migrant and recipient, arguably theymay also be proxies for higher levels of pure altruism.
60 K. Ambler / Journal of Development Economics 113 (2015) 52–69send large amounts: more than half of the migrants in both treatment
groups chose to send the entire potential prize. It should be noted that
these amounts shared are much higher than normally found in dictator
games, suggesting that the migrant context is an important one to
study. Despite the fact that the two distributions follow the same basic
shape, differences are evident. The percentage of migrants sending ev-
erything is smaller when choices are not revealed (53% versus 58%)
and the percent of migrants choosing to send $400 or less is higher
(44% versus 38%). It is also easy to see that the distribution of the choices
in the choice revealed treatment group is always below the distribution
of choices in the choice not revealed group; that is, the choice revealed
distribution stochastically dominates the choice not revealed
distribution.17
These results are formalized in Table 3, which presents the results
of estimating regression Eq. (1). Column 1 is a simple regression of
the dependent variable on treatment status, and column 2 adds the
demographic control variables. Migrants send $20 more of the
possible lottery prize when their choice will be revealed, which rep-
resents an approximate 5 percent increase over the choice not re-
vealed group mean.
Table 3 also reports the coefﬁcients on the demographic control var-
iables included in column 2. Female migrants send on average $26 less
than male migrants. Migrants who have been in the United States lon-
ger send more, although the effect is small. Migrants who live with a
spouse send $29 less than those who do not and migrants in the lowest
income bracket are estimated to send $22 less on average than those in
the other income brackets. Finally, total annual remittances sent are
positively correlated with amount sent in the experiment. The coefﬁ-
cient is small, but it suggests that migrant behavior in the experiment
is related to real-world migrant behavior.
The fact that almost all migrants in the not revealed treatment chose
to send something and that most chose to send the entire potential
prize suggests that the altruistic component of remittances is high.
However, the differences between the two treatment groups are
evidence that information asymmetries and strategic behavior also
play a role. Given that the framework discussed in Section 2 suggests
that this strategic behavior will occur when migrants react to costs
incurred when sending less than expected, it is instructive to examine
whether or not the impact of the information treatment varies in17 The p-value on the two-sampleWilcox rank-sum for equality of distributions is 0.034.remittance relationships where these costs may be more or less
important.
I utilize ﬁve variables from the baseline survey as proxies for sit-
uations where these costs may be more important: years in the
United States, migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador, migrant
and recipient are closely related, migrant communicates with recip-
ient household weekly, and remittances sent to recipient household.
The general motivation for choosing these proxies is that they are in-
dicative of relationships where remittance normsmay be higher, mi-
grants may be more likely to have entrusted the recipient with the
care of family or investments, and migrants may be more concerned
about recipient perceptions of their behavior. A detailed description
of the rationale for choosing these variables is provided in Appendix
Table 3.18 To allow comparability with the binary proxies (child in El
Salvador, close relationship, andweekly communication), I create bi-
narymeasures of the continuous variables (years in the United StatesHowever, the nature of altruistic remittances is such that they should not be affected by
variations inmonitoring. In other words, if these variables were proxies for only altruism,
the treatment effect of monitoring in the high-altruism subgroups should not be higher
than in low-altruism subgroups.
Table 4
Impact of monitoring treatment on migrant remittance decision: interactions.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dependent variable: amount sent by migrant
Proxy variable is…
Years in the United
States: below sample
median
Migrant has child
22 or under in
El Salvador
Recipient is close
relative of migrant
Migrant communicates
with recipient household
weekly
Migrant's annual remittances
to recipient household: above
sample median
Migrant choice revealed to recipient 18.16 9.769 12.91 9.994 −1.112
[17.24] [13.26] [13.29] [20.98] [16.38]
Migrant choice revealed ∗ proxy 6.888 49.52** 21.62 14.44 36.41*
[22.60] [24.45] [23.53] [24.69] [22.22]
Observations 1268 1268 1268 1268 1268
R-squared 0.225 0.219 0.214 0.212 0.214
Mean in migrant choice not revealed & proxy = 0 462.4 449.3 445.6 451.7 447.2
Mean in migrant choice not revealed & proxy = 1 427.0 424.3 433.9 438.4 437.4
Main effects for all ﬁve proxy variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. Samples are observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions, completed recipient survey and non-missing values for
the proxy variables. Amount sent by migrant is the amount that migrants chose to send when splitting $600 between themselves and recipients. All regressions include stratiﬁcation
group ﬁxed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratiﬁed. The proxy variable is interacted with all other variables in the
regression (treatment, other proxies, and stratiﬁcation cells). Recipient is deﬁned as close relative if migrant reports recipient to be his spouse, parent or child. Annual total remittances
are the combination of regular and irregular remittances. Annual regular remittances were collected by asking for the frequency of remittances sent and the average amount sent each
time. Annual irregular remittances are remittances sent for special occasions or emergencies. Themedian years in the US is 10 and themedian remittances sent to the recipient household
are $1800.
***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
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These are certainly not perfect measures, and the analysis is limited
by the fact that these characteristics were not randomly assigned
and that it was not possible to stratify the information treatment
on these characteristics.20
To examine how the impact of the monitoring treatment may
have varied with each of these proxies, I re-estimate regression
Eq. (1), now interacting the treatment indicator with each of the
proxy variables. Table 4 presents the results. Each column is a sepa-
rate regression, reporting the interaction of the treatment with
each proxy variable in turn. All regressions also include the main ef-
fects of all ﬁve proxy variables. The sample size therefore varies
slightly from Table 3 because it excludes observations with a missing
value for one of these proxies. For each of these variables, the inter-
action effect is positive. In four of the ﬁve columns (all but years in
the United States) the interaction effect is larger than the main effect
of the treatment, suggesting that treatment effects are concentrated
among those migrants where costs are hypothesized to be higher.
While these results are suggestive, they must not be over-
interpreted: for only two of the ﬁve variables are the interaction ef-
fects statistically signiﬁcant.21 It should also be noted that while
these results are supportive of the notion that migrants send more
than they would if they were solely motivated by altruism, I cannot
speciﬁcally differentiate between the possible strategic motivations,19 To be consistent with the direction of the hypothesized correlations of the other prox-
ies, below median years in the United States has been coded as one and above median
years in the United States has been coded as zero.
20 Despite the inability to stratify randomization on these variables, Appendix Table 4
shows that the subsamples are largely balanced on baseline characteristics.
21 An alternative method of evaluating the differential effect of the treatment in these
different groups is to include them all in one regression and interact each one with the
treatment indicator. This has the beneﬁt of showing whether each of these effects exists
while controlling for the others. Unfortunately, in this speciﬁcation, I do not have the pow-
er to say anything deﬁnitive about any of the interaction effects. Three of the ﬁve (years in
the United States, migrant has a son or daughter 22 or under in El Salvador, and annual re-
mittances) are large and therefore consistent with the patterns in Table 4. Some collinear-
ity is present however, as the interactions of treatment with close relative and weekly
communication are close to zero.such as themigrant's desire to appear fair or pressure from recipients
to send larger amounts home.
The results in Table 3 show that information asymmetries can affect
migrants' remittance decisions and that at least some migrants take
strategic advantage of a situation where their potential income is not
observable to recipients. However, the size of the effect, a 5 percent in-
crease in amount sent, could be considered small. Certainly given the
large amounts shared in both treatment groups it seems that other fac-
tors (such as altruism) are driving a large part of the remittance deci-
sion. However, I argue that the information effect is also economically
signiﬁcant. The size of the effect can be compared to average remittance
amounts. Assuming that the average migrant sends remittances on a
monthly basis (and the majority of migrants in this sample report
doing so), $20 everymonth results in $240 a year. $240 is approximately
equal to the average monthly remittance sent by migrants in this
sample, suggesting that the information effect could account for an
additional monthly remittance every year. Although the effect size
will depend on the amount over which the migrant makes their
choice and it is not clear how the magnitudes of the experimental
effect would compare to the magnitudes of real life decisions, this com-
parison does suggest that the information effect can be of economic
importance.
Additionally, the effect size is similar to the size of the correlations
with the demographic variables in Table 3, meaning that this informa-
tion effect is of similar importance in determining the migrant's choice
as demographic characteristics such as income or gender. The effect
size is also comparable to other studies examining the effects of making
choices in dictator games known to the recipient in families (Hoel,
2014) and social networks (Leider et al., 2009; Ligon and Schechter,
2012).
5.2. Recipient experiment
The migrant experiment found that migrants react strategically to
variations in the ability of recipients to monitor their income. Previous
literature has suggested that migrant monitoring of recipients should
also be important (Ashraf et al., forthcoming; Chen, 2013; de Laat,
2014). To look for these effects in the context of this experiment, I
Table 5
Mean amounts allocated to spending groups by recipients and migrants: recipient experiment.
Means of recipient choices by treatment group: Means of migrant
preferences:
Monitoring treatment Communication treatment
Recipient choice not
revealed to migrant
Recipient choice revealed
to migrant
Migrant preferences not
revealed to recipient
Migrant preferences
revealed to recipient
Amount allocated to:
Restaurant meals 6.11 5.46 5.38 6.17 11.74
Education 175.54 166.22 170.97 170.64 141.41
Daily expenses 66.05 75.59 72.85 68.99 76.56
Health expenses 52.30 52.73 50.80 54.20 70.28
Observations 638 660 641 657 1298
Notes: Samples are observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Means in columns 1 through 4 are from responses by
recipients when asked to allocate $300 across four spending categories. Means in column 5 are responses frommigrants when asked how they would like the recipient to allocate
the funds.
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located a potential $300 remittance prize among four spending
categories.
Mean amounts allocated to different spending categories by re-
cipients andmigrants are presented in Table 5. The ﬁrst two columns
show the amounts allocated by recipients broken down by the recip-
ient monitoring treatment, and columns 3 and 4 show recipient allo-
cations by the communication treatment. The ﬁfth column shows the
means of the preferences reported by the migrant. For both recipi-
ents and migrants, education is the most popular choice.22 Daily ex-
penses are the next most popular category, followed closely by
health and ﬁnally restaurant meals. Migrants allocate less to educa-
tion than recipients andmore to the other categories, but no clear ev-
idence indicates that migrants strongly prefer different expenditure
categories than recipients.
I utilize the data collected from both the migrant and the recipi-
ent to analyze how the treatments affect the pair-level differences
between their choices.23 Table 6 shows the results from estimating
regression Eq. (2). The dependent variables in columns 1 through 4
are the migrant–recipient differences in restaurant spending, educa-
tion spending, spending on daily expenses, and health spending, re-
spectively. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is the total
migrant–recipient difference. Column 6 adds demographic control
variables.
The results presented in Table 6 show no evidence of any impact of
the recipient monitoring treatment. The coefﬁcients for the four spend-
ing categories are too imprecisely estimated to describe a consistent
pattern, but for themain outcomeof interest, the totalmigrant recipient
difference (columns 5 and 6), the coefﬁcients on both the main effect
and the interaction with the communication treatment are close to
zero and statistically insigniﬁcant.
Differences are evident for the communication treatment. For all
spending categories, the coefﬁcient on the main effect of the variable
indicating that the migrant preference was revealed to the recipient
is negative. This means that the differences between recipient
choices and migrant preferences are smaller when the migrants'
preferences are revealed than when they are not, even when the22 It should be noted that the preference for education may be partly due to the fact that
participants answered this question at the conclusion of a survey that focused on ques-
tions about education, meaning that they may have been primed to consider education.
This is not necessarily a problem as there is no reason to believe that eithermigrants or re-
cipients were more primed than the other, but it does suggest that the indicated prefer-
ences should be considered as only in the context of the experiment.
23 Appendix C discusses the results of an alternative speciﬁcation that examine the im-
pacts of the monitoring and communication treatments on the average amount allocated
to each category.recipient choices were not revealed to the migrant. Of all the spend-
ing categories, only the difference for education (column 3) is statis-
tically signiﬁcant, but importantly, so is the total difference (columns
5 and 6), implying that migrant and recipient choices are getting
closer together overall. Across speciﬁcations the results indicate
that there is a $14 reduction in the total difference when the
migrant's preferences are revealed and the recipient's allocation
will not be shared with the migrant. This represents a 10% reduction
relative to the mean in the group where neither the recipient's
choice nor themigrant's preference was revealed. The effect is driven
by the difference in education spending, largely because education
spending is by far the most preferred category.
The ﬁrst result from the recipient experiment is that the moni-
toring treatment has no impact on the difference between migrant
preferences and recipient choices. This implies that recipients do
not react strategically to variation in whether or not their choices
will be observed. The framework presented in Section 2 proposes
an explanation for why recipients may not take advantage of the
opportunity to hide their spending choices from migrants. The
costs that would induce recipients to react to being monitored
may simply be low across the population. In practice, this would re-
sult in a situation where recipients are not compelled to spend re-
mittances according to migrant preferences beyond what they
choose to do altruistically.
Although low costs associated with remittance spending decisions
are a convincing explanation for the lack of effect of the monitoring
treatment, it is important to consider other possible explanations. The
ﬁrst alternative explanation is that migrant monitoring of recipients is
essentially perfect and that recipients know that their choices will be
discovered if they win. However, only 24% of migrants correctly report
student GPA and 43% correctly report how students travel to school
(Table 1); therefore it does not seem plausible that existing monitoring
is good enough to render the experimental variation irrelevant. A sec-
ond explanation is that migrants and recipients have the same prefer-
ences for spending, and therefore they make the same choices
regardless of punishment ability. This may be true for some families,
but if it were true for most, there should be no impact of the communi-
cation treatment. Additionally, only 48% of migrant–recipient pairs re-
port the same three budget priorities (Table 1), further evidence of
heterogeneity in preferences. A ﬁnal alternative explanation is that mi-
grants simply have no preference for how the remittances are spent and
allow recipients to spend them however they see ﬁt. This cannot be de-
ﬁnitively ruled out, but again, if recipients knew that migrants had no
strong preferences, there should be no impact of the communication
treatment.
The second result from the recipient experiment is that reveal-
ing migrant preferences decreases the difference between migrant
Table 6
Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dependent variable: migrant–recipient difference in… Dependent variable: total
migrant–recipient
difference
Restaurant
spending
Education
spending
Daily expenses
spending
Health
spending
Recipient choice revealed to migrant −2.848 −0.0745 9.540 −2.380 2.119 3.158
[3.276] [7.036] [5.888] [5.996] [6.619] [6.714]
Migrant preference revealed to recipient −4.591 −18.55*** −0.610 −5.267 −14.51** −13.86**
[3.054] [6.886] [6.061] [5.994] [6.752] [6.918]
Choice revealed ∗ preference revealed 3.633 8.570 −10.88 2.218 1.769 0.340
[4.202] [9.951] [8.482] [8.415] [9.600] [9.745]
Observations 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298 1298
R-squared 0.102 0.105 0.093 0.091 0.105 0.122
Mean in recipient choice not revealed, migrant preference not revealed 18.0 116.2 78.3 77.9 145.2
Control variables No No No No No Yes
Notes: Robust standard errors in brackets. Samples are observations with non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Dependent variables are the
absolute difference between the recipient's choice and themigrant's preferences in each category. The total difference is the sum across the four difference variables for each observation,
divided by two. All regressions include stratiﬁcation group ﬁxed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratiﬁed and treatment
status in the migrant experiment. Control variables are migrant and recipient gender, age, years of education, and household size. Controls also include migrant years in the United
States, whether migrant lives with spouse, whether migrant has a child 22 or under in El Salvador, whether the migrant and recipient are close relatives, if the migrant is in the lowest
income bracket, annual total remittances to recipient household, whether themigrant and recipient communicate at least weekly, and the number of days in betweenmigrant and recip-
ient survey.
***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
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will be not be revealed to the migrant. This suggests that migrant
preferences do matter to recipients and that some deviation from
those preferences may be inadvertent. A potential criticism of this
result is that recipients are simply reacting to being given a sug-
gested allocation for the choice they are making and may have
reacted in the same way even if the preferences were attributed
to someone besides the migrant. I address this concern by examin-
ing heterogeneity in the effects of the communication treatment by
proxies for the quality of information in the relationship. Speciﬁcal-
ly, in Appendix Table 5, I estimate regression Eq. (2) separately by
whether or not the migrant can correctly report the student's GPA
and mode of transport to school. Although these variables are not
direct representations of recipient knowledge of migrant prefer-
ences, they are likely to indicate low information quality in general.
If recipients are reacting to a lack of knowledge of the migrants'
preferences, the effects of the communication treatment should
be concentrated among pairs where information quality is low. I
ﬁnd suggestive evidence that this is indeed the case: effects of
the communication treatment appear to be concentrated among
migrants who do not know students' GPAs or modes of transporta-
tion to school.245.3. Threats to interpretation
Although the experimental methodology used in this paper al-
lows for the causal identiﬁcation of the effects of information
asymmetries, it is important to consider how the experimental con-
text could distort participant behavior relative to real life. The ﬁrst
potential issue is experimenter-demand effects, the idea that be-
cause participant decisions in the experiment are measured by the
experimenter participants may act in a more pro-social manner
than they would if their choices were truly anonymous. This24 A potential caveat to this argument is that the migrant lack of knowledge may in fact
represent lower baseline valuation of education on behalf of the migrant, which could be
correlated with larger initial differences in preferences. However, migrants in the low in-
formation groups do not allocate less money to education.question has been widely explored through a series of lab experi-
ments that vary whether or not participant choices are observable
to the experimenter. Levitt and List (2007) provide a review of
these studies which generally show that subjects become less gen-
erous as anonymity is increased, but Barmettler et al. (2012) ﬁnd
no impact of experimenter–subject anonymity when using a new
technique that resolves their criticisms of past studies. However,
experimenter-demand effects are actually broader than the issue
of experimenter–subject anonymity, as subjects may behave differ-
ently simply because they know they are participating in an exper-
iment (Levitt and List, 2007). This issue is certainly present in this
study, but because the questions were framed as a reward for partic-
ipating in the survey and not explicitly as an experiment, it is possi-
ble that the scrutiny is not as important here as in a true lab
experiment. Regardless, because the focus of the paper is the effect
of the information treatment, the main results are only affected if
experimenter-demand effects are expected to be more important
for one treatment group than for the other. While it is not possible
to rule this out, there is no clear argument for the direction of such
an interaction effect.
Experimenter-demand effects can also play a role in the recipient
communication treatment. Recipients may, for example, feel obliged
to follow migrant preferences because the surveyor will observe their
choice. Again, there is no way to rule this out, but given that there is
no impact of the migrant monitoring treatment, in order for
experimenter-demand effects to explain a large portion of the observed
effect of the communication treatment, recipients would have to re-
spondmuchmore strongly to scrutiny by the surveyors than to observa-
tion by the migrants themselves.
The second issue is that the prize money in the experiment is a one-
time windfall as opposed to regular earned income. Studies that have
examined earned versus unearned windfall income have found that
people are more generous with unearned winnings (for
example Cherry et al. (2002) and Jakiela (2014)). As in the case of
experimenter-demand effects, the ultimate concern in this experiment
is whether or not this windfall effect differentially impacts the two
treatment groups. In this case, the impact of the monitoring treatment
may increase if income were earned as migrants feel more ownership
over the winnings but are still compelled to share them when their
choices are observable. Alternatively, if social norms dictate that
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fect of monitoring would be expected with windfall income. Both of
these effects may also be operating at the same time and given that
there is no way to identify which might larger, the results should be
interpreted with this in mind.
The ﬁnal issue is that of the fungibility of choices made during the
experiment. Both migrants and recipients could potentially undo their
choices during the experiment through their actions afterward. For ex-
ample, migrants could choose to not send a remittance that they would
have sent otherwise. Although some of this behavior may be occurring,
it is not necessarily important for the interpretation of the treatment. If
the results show differences between the two treatments then that is
evidence that people are reacting to variations in information.25
6. Conclusion and policy implications
This paper analyzes a set of experiments designed to test for the
effects of information asymmetries in transnational households. Eco-
nomic studies of information asymmetries in households with mi-
grants have until now focused on migrant monitoring of recipient
behavior and the impacts of offering migrants greater control over
how remittances are spent. This is the ﬁrst study that explicitly
looks at the effect of information asymmetries on both sides of the re-
mittance relationship—migrants' sending of remittances as well as
recipients' spending of those remittances. Despite the previous em-
phasis on migrant monitoring, the results of the two monitoring
treatments presented in this paper are that, in this context, only mi-
grants strategically react to variations in the probability that their ac-
tions will be monitored.
This is an important ﬁnding, not only because it shows that informa-
tion asymmetries have an important impact on the remittance sending
decision, but also because this suggests that recipients have important
inﬂuence in the migrant–recipient relationship.26 Because migrants
control the ﬂow of remittances they send to their family members,
documenting this recipient inﬂuence is important precisely because it
goes against the prior that those who control themoney are necessarily
in the best bargaining position. Policymakers who seek to design tools
to facilitate the sending of remittances and enhance their impacts
should consider the role of the recipient in determining remittance
amounts.
The analysis in this paper indicates that because migrants are
responding to the opportunity to hide income, someof themare already
sending home more than they would choose to altruistically. This im-
plies that programs that seek to further increase remittances may face
difﬁculties within this group. Policymakers should also consider the
welfare implications of such a policy. The pressure that migrants face
to send remittances is related to a growing literature on sharing pres-
sures in family networks in developing countries. Recent work by di
Falco and Bulte (2011) and Jakiela and Ozier (2012) suggests that the
expectation that resources will be shared with extended family may in-
hibit individual economic progress. In this context, given the results of
the migrant experiment and the low income status of the migrants, it
is not clear that potential extra remittance funds are necessarily more
welfare enhancing from the perspective of the migrant when spent in
El Salvador than if they were to be used by the migrants in the United
States.
Overall, the ﬁndings that information asymmetries can affect
both the sending and spending of remittances suggest that interven-
tions or technological innovations that improve communication in25 Even without evidence of differences between treatments, if participants wish to do
something that their partner would disagree with, it makes sense for them to take advan-
tage of the experiment to do so, when the probability of keeping that action secret is high.
26 As described earlier this inﬂuencemay operate directly, through pressure from the re-
cipient, or indirectly, if the recipient wishes to appear altruistic to the recipient.transnational households could have important effects on ﬁnancial
decisions made by both migrants and recipients. In particular, the re-
sults of the communication experiment imply that for migrants who
wish to change the spending behavior of their family members, pol-
icies that improve communication about spending preferences may
be an inexpensive way to achieve a higher level of compliance with
their preferences.
This discussion assumes that alleviating inadvertent information
asymmetries in transnational households increases welfare. However,
if, for example, migrant preferences are based on old or mis-
information, encouraging the recipient to follow such preferences may
actually have negative impacts on the recipient household. This, com-
bined with the strategic behavior of migrants in the migrant experi-
ment, suggests that the welfare effects of alleviating information
asymmetries are complex. While this paper documents the importance
of these information issues, further research should more carefully in-
vestigate their welfare implications in both transnational and co-
resident households.
Appendix A. Details of companion experiment
The experiments described in this paper were conducted as a part of
the data collection for a ﬁeld experiment on remittances and education
described in detail in “Channeling Remittances to Education: A Field Ex-
periment among Migrants from El Salvador” (Ambler et al.,
forthcoming). This appendix provides details on the implementation
of that project and discusses the potential ways in which the design
may have impacted the results in this paper.
The goal of the companion project was to study a new payment
mechanism called the EduRemesa that allowedmigrants to direct re-
mittance funds to the education of a secondary or tertiary student in
El Salvador. The project studied both the unsubsidized and subsi-
dized versions of the EduRemesa, analyzing both take-up of the
product and its impacts on education related outcomes of beneﬁcia-
ry students.
The EduRemesa was administered by FEPADE, an educational
foundation in El Salvador and provided funds directly to the beneﬁ-
ciary student for each month of a ten month school year. These
funds were allocated through a bank account and debit card provid-
ed to the student for this purpose. Migrants chose from pre-
determined EduRemesa amounts: $300 or $500 for secondary stu-
dents and $600 or $800 for tertiary students. These funds were de-
posited in equal installments across the ten month school year.
EduRemesas were sent by the migrant through Viamericas, a
money transfer company. The money was remitted to FEPADE, and
the migrants indicated the student as the beneﬁciary in the course
of the transaction.
Migrants were recruited to participate by project staff stationed
in the two Washington, DC area locations of the Salvadoran consul-
ates. Because the EduRemesa was aimed at secondary and tertiary
level students, migrants were required to name a student at that
level in order to participate. In particular, because the study sought
to measure project impacts on students in El Salvador through sur-
veys, we elicited the name of a student who the migrant would be
likely to support if offered the EduRemesa from all migrants in all
treatment groups. This elicitation was done at the beginning of
the survey before any treatments were administered so that the
choice of student would not be affected by the treatment offer.
Migrants were informed that they could enter one student in El
Salvador of their choosing into a lottery to win a $500 scholarship
for the next academic year. The named student and their household
are referred to as the target student and the target household
respectively.
Migrantswhoagreed to participate completed a baseline survey that
contained questions related to demographics, remittances, and the tar-
get student and household. At the end of the survey the migrant
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making the allocation of the potential $600 lottery prize and then listing
their preferences for the recipient spending of the potential $300 recip-
ient lottery prize. Following the conclusion of the survey, the project
staff implemented the randomized EduRemesa treatment. Because the
implementation of the treatment occurred after the migrant answered
the experimental questions, it should not have impacted the responses
to those questions.
The EduRemesa treatment was allocated through a two-stage ran-
domization process. First, each day and each recruitment location was
randomized into either the control group or the group which received
an offer of the EduRemesa. Within the group that received the
EduRemesa offer, an individual-level randomization was performed to
allocate each migrant into one of three subsidy groups: those receiving
no matching funds, those for whom EduRemesa funds provided by the
migrant were matched one to one by the project, and those for whom
those funds were matched three to one.
Migrants in the control group received information discussing the
importance of sending remittances home for education which
highlighted the strategy of sending money directly to the student
in small, monthly installments. Those in the EduRemesa treatments
received this information, as well as the introduction to the
EduRemesa product. At the conclusion of the presentation of the
product, migrants in the EduRemesa treatment groups were asked
if they were interested in participating and whether they would
like to receive follow-up information. Migrants who expressed an in-
terest were re-contacted by the survey team to assist with the pro-
cess and answer any further questions. The survey team continued
to follow up until the migrant indicated that he or she was no longer
interested.
During the baseline survey themigrantwas required to provide con-
tact details for the target student or household. Within a week after the
initial interaction, this information was used to contact the target
household and perform an initial survey. These interviews were con-
ducted with the target student if the target student was 18 or over,
and the target student's guardian if the target student was under 18. If
neither was available, the interviews were conducted with another
knowledgeable adult in the household. This survey contained questions
related to demographics and remittances, and had an extensive module
related to education expenditures for all students in the household. The
experimental question analyzed in this paper (the recipient decides
how to allocate a potential $300 lottery prize) was the last question in
the survey and ended the interaction. No information related to the
EduRemesa was discussed during the interview and surveyors did not
know which version of the EduRemesa the migrant in the family had
been offered if at all.
The most important way in which the design of the EduRemesa
study could have impacted the results in this paper relates to the time
between when the baseline survey with the migrant was conducted
and when the target household was interviewed. The median number
of days between interviews was eight, and given that the randomized
EduRemesa treatment was implemented at baseline in the United
States, there was time for migrants to discuss it with their family mem-
bers before completing the interview.
This could have affected the recipients' responses by priming them
to think about education and therefore allocate more money to educa-
tional expenditures. This is certainly possible, but there is no way to di-
rectly test for this. In fact, the survey itself focused heavily on education,
so it is likely that played a larger part in priming respondents. In order
for this to threaten the interpretation of the results in the paper
(which focus on differences between the migrant and the respondent,
not the particular category to which they allocated money), the
EduRemesa treatments must have had a differential impact on respon-
dent choices. However, including the EduRemesa treatment variables
in the regressions has no impact on the results, and they are additionally
not statistically signiﬁcantly correlated with the outcome variables.Finally, the EduRemesa treatments are not signiﬁcantly related to the
raw allocation choices made by the recipients in any systematic way.
For example, recipients do not allocate more money to education in
cases where the migrant received the three to one subsidy offer.
Appendix B. Text used in experiments
B.1. Migrant experiment
To thank you and your family for your participation in this study
now we are going to give you the opportunity to participate in two
more lotteries. Let me tell you about them.
Question 1:
First, you have the chance to win $600. You can keep this money or
you can choose to send some or all of it to name of person to be surveyed
in El Salvador. However, you must tell me now how much you want to
keep and how much you want to send and if you win the choice you
make now will be carried out.
Treatment 0: Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project
we cannot inform name of person to be surveyed about what you decide
to dowith themoney. This means that your decision is a secret.Name of
person to be surveyed will not be told how much you have decided to
send and how much you have decided to keep.
Treatment 1: Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project
we have to inform name of person to be surveyed about what you decide
to do with the money. This means that your decision is not a secret.
Name of person to be surveyedwill be told how much you have decided
to send and how much you have decided to keep.
Let's make this decision now. You have the following options: (sur-
veyor shows options to migrant)
☐ KEEP: $600 and SEND: $0
☐ KEEP: $500 and SEND: $100
☐ KEEP: $400 and SEND: $200
☐ KEEP: $300 and SEND: $300
☐ KEEP: $200 and SEND: $400
☐ KEEP: $100 and SEND: $500
☐ KEEP: $0 and SEND: $600
Question 2:
Now I am going to tell you about a second lottery that is completely
different and separate from the ﬁrst one. Because you have participated
in our survey, name of person to be surveyedwill have the opportunity to
win a remittanceworth $300 andwill need to choose howhe/shewould
like to receive it if he/she wins. He/she cannot pick anything but must
choose among the following categories: meals at local restaurants, edu-
cation related expenses, daily expenses like groceries, and health relat-
ed expenses. He/she can spend it all on one thing or break it up among
different things.
Name of person to be surveyedwill decide how he/she would like to
receive the remittance. However, we would like to know how you
would prefer that name of person to be surveyed allocate this remittance.Spending category: Amount:1. Meals at local restaurants (ex: Pollo Campero, Burger King)
2. Education related expenses (ex: supplies, uniforms, books)
3. Daily expenses like groceries
4. Health related expenses (ex: medicine, doctor's visits)
Total (verify adds up to $300):B.2. Recipient experiment:
Because name of migrant participated in our study, you now have
the chance to receive a remittance worth $300. Some participants
Appendix Table 1
Comparison of migrants in study with DC-area Salvadorans in the American Community
Survey.
Baseline
survey
American Community
Survey: 2008–201 0 3-year
sample
Analysis
sample
Salvadoran-born, not US
citizen
Migrant is female 0.51 0.46
Age of migrant 36.92 36.05
[9.30] [10.39]
Migrant's years in the US 11.13 12.93
[8.09] [7.89]
Migrant's hh size in the US 4.36 4.95
[1.96] [2.12]
Migrant has less than high school education 0.62 0.61
Migrant has high school education or more 0.38 0.39
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remittance can only be spent on a limited number of things. In
order to participate you must tell me now how you would like to
allocate the remittance among the following categories, and if
you win, you will receive exactly what you have told me that
you want. The categories are: meals at local restaurants, education
related expenses, daily expenses like groceries, and health related
expenses. You can spend it all on one thing or break it up among
different things.
Treatment 1: You can choose anything that you like.
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we
cannot inform name of migrant about what you decide to
do. This means that your decision is a secret. Name of
migrant will not be told about what you decide to spend the
money on.
Treatment 2: When we spoke with name of migrantwe asked him/
her what he/she prefers for you to spend this money on and he/she in-
dicated that he/she would like you to choose ______. However, you can
choose anything that you like.
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we can-
not inform name of migrant about what you decide to do. This
means that your decision is a secret. Name of migrant will not
be told about what you decide to spend the money on.
Treatment 3: You can choose anything that you like.
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we have to in-
form name ofmigrant aboutwhat you decide to do. Thismeans that your
decision is not a secret. Name of migrantwill be told about exactly what
you decided to spend the money on.
Treatment 4: When we spoke with name of migrantwe asked him/
her what he/she prefers for you to spend this money on and he/she in-
dicated that he/she would like you to choose ______. However, you can
choose anything that you like.
Keep in mind that because of the rules of this project we
have to inform name of migrant about what you decide to do.
This means that your decision is not a secret. Name of migrant
will be told about exactly what you decided to spend the
money on.
Let's make this decision now. Howwould you like to allocate this re-
mittance among the following categories?Observations 1298 2208
Spending category: Amount:Notes: Baseline survey samples are observations with non-missing values for all experi-
ment questions and completed recipient survey. Sample size varies slightly with variable:1. Meals at local restaurants (ex: Pollo Campero, Burger King)1264 for age; 1295 for years in US; 1290 for education variables. ACS sample is the IPUMS2. Education related expenses (ex: supplies, uniforms, books)three year 2008–2010 ACS sample restricted to individuals 18–65 in the Washington, DC3. Daily expenses like groceriesmetro area (as deﬁned by the ACS, includes MD and VA suburbs). Standard deviation in4. Health related expenses (ex: medicine, doctor's visits)brackets for continuous variables.Total (verify adds up to $300):Appendix Table 2
Relationship of migrant to recipient.
The recipient is the migrant's… Percent
Spouse 2.87
Parent 13.09
Daughter/son 15.18
Sibling 28.66
Grandparent 0.39
Grandchild 0.70
Niece/nephew 14.87
Cousin 7.51
Aunt/uncle 3.49
Parent-in-law 1.47
Daughter/son-in-law 0.39
Sister/brother-in-law 4.03
Friend 2.25
Other 5.11Appendix C. Alternative speciﬁcation for recipient experiment
This appendix discusses an alternative speciﬁcation to analyze
the impacts of the recipient treatment that does not utilize infor-
mation on the migrants' preferences and examines the impacts of
the treatments on the amount allocated by the recipient to each
category. The results are presented in Appendix Table 6. This spec-
iﬁcation ﬁnds no impact of the communication treatment. As
discussed in the estimation section of the main text, this is possi-
ble if average migrant preferences are similar to average recipient
preferences but pair-level disagreement in those preferences is
important.
An interesting component of this speciﬁcation is that the moni-
toring treatment does appear to increase the average amount allo-
cated to daily expenses. However, the interaction term between
the two treatments is negative, suggesting that recipients mayhave thought migrants wanted them to spend more on daily ex-
penses, but realized they were incorrect when informed of migrant
preferences. There is also a decrease in the amount allocated to ed-
ucation, although this effect is not statistically signiﬁcant. This pat-
tern of results would be compatible with the results in Table 6 of
the main text if recipients respond to the monitoring treatment by
altering their choices, and as a result some migrant–recipient differ-
ences decrease and others increase. One would expect this to hap-
pen only when some recipients are not informed about migrant
preferences (causing them to possibly make a choice that increases
the difference in preferences). Given that the communication treat-
ment makes migrant preferences explicit, if migrants are indeed
responding to the monitoring treatment we should see a decrease
in the migrant–recipient difference for those recipients who are ex-
posed to both the monitoring and the communication treatment.
However, there is no interaction effect of the two treatments in
the speciﬁcation presented in Table 6. Given this, the interpretation
of these results of the monitoring treatment is unclear. As the recip-
ient experiment was speciﬁcally designed to measure changes in the
pair-level differences, I focus on those results.Appendix D. Appendix Tables
Appendix Table 3
Variables for subgroup analysis.
Variable Expected correlation
with remittance
costs/beneﬁts
Justiﬁcation Subgroup deﬁnition
Migrant years in the United
States:
Negative A migrant's reputation at home is important for migrants who wish to
return, and the probability of return may decline with length of time in the
United States. With time it is also more likely that the migrant has paid off
any debts related to initial migration costs.
The median number of years in the
United States is 10.
Migrant has a child 22 or
under in El Salvador
Positive Migrants may have left children in the care of the recipient, and the
possibility of child care that does not meet the migrant's preferences could
be a powerful tool.
34% of migrants have a son or daughter
aged 22 or under in El Salvador.
Migrant and recipient are
closely related
Positive This is deﬁned as spouses or parent and child. Migrants may have entrusted
recipients with the care of things that are important to them, and positive
relationships with the recipients may be valuable to the migrants. Social
norms may also be stronger in this group.
31% of migrants and recipients are closely
related.
Migrant communicates with
recipient household weekly
Positive Frequent communication is a sign that migrants value their relationships
with recipients.
71% of migrants report communicating
weekly with the recipient household.
Remittances sent by migrant
to recipient household
Positive Because remittance relationships where recipients induce migrants to send
money result in higher payments, higher remittances may indicate high costs.
The median annual remittance total to
the recipient household reported by the
migrant is $1,800.
Appendix Table 4
Balance tests by subgroup: migrant experiment.
P-value for difference of means: choice not revealed and choice revealed
Years in the United States Migrant has
child 22 or
under in El
Salvador
Recipient is
close relative
of migrant
Migrant
communicates
with recipient
household
weekly
Migrant's annual remittances
to recipient household
Above sample
median
Below sample
median
No Yes No Yes No Yes Below sample
median
Above sample
median
Baseline variables from US survey
Migrant is female 0.206 0.588 0.228 0.587 0.155 0.686 0.481 0.335 0.694 0.078
Migrant age 0.674 0.736 0.696 0.684 0.413 0.371 0.069 0.170 0.644 0.534
Migrant can read and write 0.925 0.026 0.406 0.169 0.277 0.268 0.938 0.131 0.630 0.029
Migrant's years of education 0.797 0.869 0.787 0.386 0.688 0.452 0.744 0.952 0.121 0.246
Migrant is married 0.045 0.881 0.047 0.624 0.260 0.407 0.587 0.148 0.388 0.222
Migrant lives with spouse 0.418 0.329 0.052 0.025 0.651 0.886 0.168 0.340 0.133 0.176
Migrant's total number of children 0.589 0.893 0.714 0.105 0.322 0.432 0.624 0.560 0.257 0.339
Migrant's number of children in El Salvador 0.825 0.288 0.809 0.513 0.733 0.600 0.509 0.070 0.584 0.333
Migrant's number of children in US 0.433 0.187 0.793 0.205 0.190 0.528 0.886 0.195 0.390 0.009
Migrant's hh size in US 0.308 0.646 0.990 0.316 0.768 0.912 0.796 0.710 0.560 0.896
Migrant has worked in last 12 months 0.139 0.291 0.994 0.582 0.738 0.717 0.484 0.584 0.904 0.647
Migrant in lowest income bracket 0.442 0.537 0.460 0.631 0.320 0.230 0.811 0.936 0.815 0.971
Baseline variables from recipient survey
Recipient is target student 0.775 0.514 0.581 0.208 0.851 0.358 0.631 0.643 0.989 0.899
Recipient is student's guardian 0.266 0.358 0.550 0.071 0.279 0.150 0.841 0.099 0.312 0.334
Recipient is female 0.399 0.579 0.976 0.045 0.307 0.543 0.654 0.177 0.831 0.260
Recipient age 0.147 0.120 0.373 0.020 0.102 0.070 0.620 0.041 0.385 0.071
Recipient is married 0.287 0.296 0.315 0.195 0.499 0.477 0.749 0.857 0.752 0.712
Recipient's years of education 0.368 0.477 0.807 0.014 0.285 0.349 0.942 0.237 0.956 0.194
Recipient lives in urban area 0.135 0.374 0.966 0.414 0.581 0.881 0.361 0.972 0.393 0.787
Recipient's hh size 0.115 0.503 0.026 0.718 0.089 0.459 0.467 0.136 0.531 0.109
Annual remittances received from migrant ($) 0.620 0.712 0.892 0.940 0.246 0.297 0.168 0.503 0.102 0.692
Notes: Samples are observationswith non-missing values for the experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Sample size for each comparison ofmeans varies slightly bymiss-
ing values for each variable. Other notes on variable construction are as in Table 1. P-values come from a regression of each variable on treatment, with standard errors adjusted for
heteroskedasticity.
Appendix Table 5
Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision: by information quality measure.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Total migrant–recipient difference
Migrant correctly reports student
GPA
Migrant correctly reports student
mode of transport to school
No Yes No Yes
Recipient choice revealed to migrant 1.222 0.572 0.0117 4.654
[8.417] [22.75] [9.768] [11.81]
(continued on next page)
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Appendix Table 6
Impact of monitoring and communication treatments on recipient allocation decision: amounts allocated by recipient.
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: amount allocated by recipient to…
Restaurant spending Education spending Daily expenses spending Health spending
Recipient choice revealed to migrant −1.189 −10.36 16.83*** −5.286
[1.413] [7.722] [5.716] [5.242]
Migrant preference revealed to recipient 0.628 −1.591 2.717 −1.754
[1.517] [7.546] [5.447] [5.214]
Choice revealed ∗ preference revealed 0.616 4.733 −14.15* 8.799
[2.216] [10.70] [7.802] [7.344]
Observations 1298 1298 1298 1298
R-squared 0.129 0.117 0.105 0.107
Mean in recipient choice not revealed, migrant preference not revealed 17.99 116.2 78.33 77.94
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. Samples are observationswith non-missing values for all experiment questions and completed recipient survey. Dependent variables are the
raw amounts allocated by recipient to different spending categories. All regressions include stratiﬁcation group ﬁxed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within
which randomization was stratiﬁed and treatment status in the migrant experiment.
***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
Appendix Table 5 (continued)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable: Total migrant–recipient difference
Migrant correctly reports student
GPA
Migrant correctly reports student
mode of transport to school
No Yes No Yes
Migrant preference revealed to recipient −17.78** 2.059 −22.71** −10.94
[8.515] [20.20] [10.25] [12.04]
Choice revealed ∗ preference revealed 2.028 5.498 −2.648 12.54
[12.38] [31.54] [14.81] [16.99]
P-values for equality of treatment effects:
Monitoring treatment 0.976 0.761
Communication treatment 0.311 0.454
Monitoring ∗ communication 0.908 0.499
Observations 787 254 633 474
R-squared 0.157 0.397 0.228 0.243
Mean in recipient choice not revealed, migrant preference not revealed 146.3 129.2 150.0 135.0
Notes: Robust standard errors are in brackets. Samples are observations with non-missing values for experiment questions, completed recipient survey and non-missing values for var-
iables used for division into sub-samples. Responses to GPA and transport questionswere only recorded if studentwas reported to be in school.Migrantswere asked to report the student's
GPA within a 2 point (out of 10) range, while recipients reported an exact number. The migrant is said of have correctly reported the GPA if the recipient's response was within the range
the migrant indicated. All regressions include stratiﬁcation group ﬁxed effects: dummy variables for the groups of survey numbers within which randomization was stratiﬁed and treat-
ment status in the migrant experiment.
***p b 0.01, **p b 0.05, *p b 0.1.
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Prior to implementation of the experiment a small pilot was con-
ducted to test the clarity of the questions. The pilot was conducted as
part of a pilot test of the baseline survey and consisted of approximately
20 participants. The pilot was also used to calibrate the amounts that
were used in the experimental questions and the categories that were
offered in the recipient experiment. The pilot also tested the format of
the migrant experiment: whether or not migrants were required to
split their allocation in $100 increments.
Appendix F. Supplementary data
Supplementary data to this article can be found online at http://dx.
doi.org/10.1016/j.jdeveco.2014.11.001.
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